In order to understand the development of non-genetically encoded actions during an animal's lifespan, it is necessary to analyze the dynamics and evolution of learning rules producing behavior. Owing to the intrinsic stochastic and frequency-dependent nature of learning dynamics, these rules are often studied in evolutionary biology via agent-based computer simulations. In this paper, we show that stochastic approximation theory can help to qualitatively understand learning dynamics and formulate analytical models for the evolution of learning rules. We consider a population of individuals repeatedly interacting during their lifespan, and where the stage game faced by the individuals fluctuates according to an environmental stochastic process. Individuals adjust their behavioral actions according to learning rules belonging to the class of experience-weighted attraction learning mechanisms, which includes standard reinforcement and Bayesian learning as special cases. We use stochastic approximation theory in order to derive differential equations governing action play probabilities, which turn out to have qualitative features of mutator-selection equations. We then perform agent-based simulations to find the conditions where the deterministic approximation is closest to the original stochastic learning process for standard 2-action 2-player fluctuating games, where interaction between learning rules and preference reversal may occur. Finally, we analyze a simplified model for the evolution of learning in a producer-scrounger game, which shows that the exploration rate can interact in a non-intuitive way with other features of co-evolving learning rules. Overall, our analyses illustrate the usefulness of applying stochastic approximation theory in the study of animal learning.
Introduction
The abundance of resources and the environments to which organisms are exposed vary in space and time. Organisms are thus facing complex fluctuating biotic and abiotic conditions to which they must constantly adjust (Shettleworth, 2009; Dugatkin, 2010) .
Animals have a nervous system, which can encode behavioral rules allowing them to adjust their actions to changing environmental conditions (Shettleworth, 2009; Dugatkin, 2010) . In particular, the presence of a reward system allows an individual to reinforce actions increasing satisfaction and material rewards and thereby adjust behavior by learning to produce goal-oriented action paths (Thorndike, 1911; Herrnstein, 1970; Sutton and Barto, 1998; Niv, 2009) . It is probable that behaviors as different as foraging, mating, fighting, cooperating, nest building, or information gathering all involve adjustment of actions to novel environmental conditions by learning, as they have evolved to be performed under various ecological contexts and with different interaction partners (Hollis et al., 1995; Chalmeau, 1994; Villarreal and Domjan, 1998; Walsh et al., 2011; Plotnik et al., 2011) . * Corresponding author.
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In the fields of evolutionary biology and behavioral ecology there is a growing interest in understanding how natural selection shapes the learning levels and abilities of animals, but this is met with difficulties (McNamara and Houston, 2009; Hammerstein and Stevens, 2012; Fawcett et al., 2013; Lotem, 2013) . Focusing on situation specific actions does not help to understand the effects of natural selection on behavioral rules because one focuses on produced behavior and not the rules producing the behavior (e.g., Dijker, 2011) . In order to understand the dynamics and evolution of learning mechanisms and other behavioral rules, an evolutionary analysis thus has to consider explicitly the dynamics of state variables on two timescales. First, one has to consider the timescale of an individual's lifespan; that is, the behavioral timescale during which genetically encoded behavioral rules produce a dynamic sequence of actions taken by the animal. Second, there is the generational timescale, during which selection occurs on the behavioral rules themselves.
It is the behavioral timescale, where learning may occur, that seems to be the most reluctant to be analyzed (Lotem, 2013) . This may stem from the fact that learning rules intrinsically encompass constraints about the use of information and the expression of actions (in the absence of unlimited powers of computation), which curtails the direct application of standard optimality approaches for studying dynamic behavior such as optimal control theory and dynamic programming. Indeed, the dynamics of even the simplest learning rule, such as reinforcement learning by trialand-error, is hardly amenable to mathematical analysis without simplifying assumptions and focusing only on asymptotics (Bush and Mostelller, 1951; Norman, 1968; Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Börgers and Sarin, 1997; Stephens and Clements, 1998 ; but see Izquierdo et al., 2007 for predictions in finite time).
Further, the difficulty of analyzing learning dynamics is increased by two biological features that need to be taken into account. First, varying environments need to be considered because learning is favored by selection when the environment faced by the individuals in a population is not absolutely fixed across and/or within generations (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Rogers, 1988; Stephens, 1991; Feldman et al., 1996; Wakano et al., 2004; Dunlap and Stephens, 2009 ). Second, frequencydependence needs to be considered because learning is likely to occur in situations where there are social interactions between the individuals in the population (Chalmeau, 1994; Hollis et al., 1995; Villarreal and Domjan, 1998; Giraldeau and Caraco, 2000; Arbilly et al., 2010 Arbilly et al., , 2011b Plotnik et al., 2011) .
All these features taken together make the analysis of the evolution of learning rules more challenging to analyze than standard evolutionary game theory models focusing on actions or strategies for constant environments (e.g., Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Maynard Smith, 1982; Binmore and Samuelson, 1992; Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001; McElreath and Boyd, 2007; André, 2010) . Although there has been some early studies on evolutionarily stable learning rules (Harley, 1981; Houston, 1983; Houston and Sumida, 1987; Tracy and Seaman, 1995) , this research field has only recently been reignited by the use of agent-based simulations (Großet al., 2008; Josephson, 2008; Hamblin and Giraldeau, 2009; Arbilly et al., 2010 Arbilly et al., , 2011a Katsnelson et al., 2011) . It is noteworthy that during the gap in time in the study of learning in behavioral ecology, the fields of game theory and economics have witnessed an explosion of theoretical studies of learning dynamics (e.g., Jordan, 1991; Erev and Roth, 1998; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Camerer and Ho, 1999; Hopkins, 2002; Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2002; Foster and Young, 2003; Young, 2004; Sandholm, 2011) . This stems from an attempt to understand how humans learn to play in games (e.g., Camerer, 2003) and to refine static equilibrium concepts by introducing dynamics. Even if such motivations can be different from the biologists' attempt to understand the evolution of animal behavior, the underlying principles of learning are similar since actions leading to high experienced payoffs (or imagined payoffs) are reinforced over time.
Interestingly, mathematicians and game theorists have also developed tools to analytically approximate intertwined behavioral dynamics, in particular stochastic approximation theory (Ljung, 1977; Benveniste et al., 1991; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Benaïm and Hirsch, 1999a; Kushner and Yin, 2003; Young, 2004; Sandholm, 2011) . Stochastic approximation theory allows one to approximate by way of differential equations discrete time stochastic learning processes with decreasing (or very small) step-size, and thereby understand qualitatively their dynamics and potentially construct analytical models for the evolution of learning mechanisms. This approach does not seem so far to have been applied in evolutionary biology.
In this paper, we analyze by means of stochastic approximation theory an extension to fluctuating social environments of the experience-weighted attraction learning mechanism (EWA model, Camerer and Ho, 1999; Ho et al., 2007) . This is a parametric model, where the parameters describe the psychological characteristics of the learner (memory, ability to imagine payoffs of unchosen actions, exploration/exploitation inclination), and which encompasses as a special case various learning rules used in evolutionary biology such as the linear operator (McNamara and Houston, 1987; Bernstein et al., 1988; Stephens and Clements, 1998) , relative payoff sum (Harley, 1981; Hamblin and Giraldeau, 2009) and Bayesian learning (Rodriguez-Gironés and Vásquez, 1997; Geisler and Diehl, 2002) . We apply the EWA model to a situation where individuals face multiple periods of interactions during their lifetime, and where each period consists of a game (like a prisoner's dilemma game, a Hawk-Dove game), whose type changes stochastically according to an environmental process.
The paper is organized in three parts. First, we define the model and derive by way of stochastic approximation theory a set of differential equations describing action play probabilities out of which useful qualitative features about learning dynamics can be read. Second, we use the model to compare analytical and simulation results under some specific learning rules. Finally, we derive an evolutionary model for patch foraging in a producer-scrounger context, where both evolutionary and behavioral time scales are considered.
Model

Population
We consider a haploid population of constant size N. Although we are mainly interested in investigating learning dynamics, we endow for biological concreteness the organisms with a simple life cycle. This is as follows. (1) Each individual interacts socially with others repeatedly and possibly for T time periods. (2) Each individual produces a large number of offspring according to its gains and losses incurred during social interactions. (3) All individuals of the parental generation die and N individuals from the offspring generation are sampled to form the new adult generation.
Social decision problem in a fluctuating environment
The social interactions stage of the life cycle, stage (1), is the main focus of this paper and it consists of the repeated play of a game between the members of the population. At each time step t = 1, 2, . . . , T , individuals play a game, whose outcome depends on the state of the environment ω. We denote the set of environmental states by Ω, which could consist of good and bad weather, or any other environmental biotic or abiotic feature affecting the focal organism. The dynamics of environmental states
is assumed to obey a homogeneous and aperiodic Markov Chain, and we write µ(ω) for the probability of occurrence of state ω under the stationary distribution of this Markov Chain (e.g., Karlin and Taylor, 1975; Grimmett and Stirzaker, 2001) .
For simplicity, we consider that the number of actions stays constant across environmental states (only the payoffs vary), that is, at every time step t, all individuals have a fixed behavioral repertoire that consists of the set of actions A = {1, . . . , m}.
The action taken by individual i at time t is a random variable denoted by a i,t , and the action profile in the population at time t is a t = (a 1,t , . . . , a N,t ). This process generates a sequence of action profiles {a t } T t=1 . The payoff to individual i at time t when the environment is in state ω t is denoted π i (a i,t , a −i,t , ω t ), where a −i,t = (a 1,t , . . . , a i−1,t , a i+1,t , . . . , a N,t ) is the action profile of the remaining individuals in the population (all individuals except i). Note that this setting covers the case of an individual decision problem (e.g., a multi-armed bandit), where the payoff π i (a i,t , ω t ) of individual i is independent of the profile of actions a −i,t of the other members of the population.
Learning process
We assume that individuals learn to choose their actions in the game but are unable to detect the current state ω t of the environment. Each individual is characterized by a genetically determined learning rule, which prescribes how its current actions depend on its private history. The learning rules we consider belong to the class of rules defined by the so-called experienceweighted-attraction (EWA) learning model (Camerer and Ho, 1999; Camerer, 2003; Ho et al., 2007) . The reason why we use EWA is that it encapsulates many standard learning rules and translates well the natural assumption that animals have internal states, which are modified during the interactions with their environment, and that internal states have a direct (but possibly noisy) influence on action (Enquist and Ghirlanda, 2005) . In EWA learning, the internal states are attractions or ''motivations'' for actions, and the mapping from internal states (motivations) to action choice is realized via a probabilistic choice rule.
Dynamics of motivations
We first describe the dynamics of motivations. To each available action a of its action set A, individual i has an associated motivation M i,t (a) at time t that is updated according to
where
is individual i's count of the number of steps of play. The initial conditions of Eqs. (1) and (2) 
Action play probabilities
The translation of internal states (motivations) into action choice can take many forms. But it is natural to assume that the probability p i,t (a) = Pr{a i,t = a} that individual i takes action a at time t is independent of other individuals and takes the ratio form
where f (·) is a continuous and increasing function of its argument (this ratio form could be justified by appealing to the choice axiom of Luce, 1959, p. 6) . The choice rule (Eq. (4)) entails that the action that has maximal motivation at time t is chosen with the greatest probability. This is different from choosing deterministically the action that has the highest motivation. Indeed, this type of choice function allows one to model errors or exploration in the decision process of the animal (an action with a low motivation has still a probability of being chosen).
Errors can be formally implemented by imposing that
where (ε(b)) b∈A are small perturbations that are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) among choices. The idea is here to first perturb motivations by adding a small random vector ε of errors and then choose the action that has the biggest motivation. The probability that action a has maximal perturbed motivation defines the probability p i,t (a) with which action a will be chosen.
The maximizing assumption in Eq. (5) restricts the possibilities for the form taken by f . In fact, the only function satisfying at the same time both Eqs. (4)- (5) is f (M) = exp(λ i M) for 0 < λ i < ∞ depending on the distribution of perturbations (Sandholm, 2011, Chap. 6) . Replacing this expression for f in Eq. (4), we obtain that an organism chooses its actions according to the so-called logit choice function
which is in standard use across disciplines (Luce, 1959; Anderson et al., 1992; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Sutton and Barto, 1998; Camerer and Ho, 1999; Achbany et al., 2006; Ho et al., 2007; Arbilly et al., 2010 Arbilly et al., , 2011b 
Relative payoff sum
Stochastic fictitious play (FP) (equivalent to Bayesian learning with Dirichlet distributed priors) 1 1
Pure reinforcement learning (PRL)
Exploratory reinforcement learning (ERL)
Payoff-informed learning (IL) (Bush and Mostelller, 1951; Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; McNamara and Houston, 1987; Bernstein et al., 1988; Stephens and Clements, 1998; Hamblin and Giraldeau, 2009) , Relative Payoff Sum (Harley, 1981; Houston, 1983; Houston and Sumida, 1987; Tracy and Seaman, 1995), Cournot Adjustment (Cournot, 1838) , and Fictitious Play (Brown, 1951; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2002; Hopkins, 2002) all can be expressed as special cases of EWA. One of the strengths of EWA is that it encompasses at the same time both reinforcement learning (like the linear operator or relative payoff sum) and belief-based learning (like fictitious play) despite the fact that these two types of learning rules are usually thought of as cognitively very different (Erev and Roth, 1998; Hopkins, 2002; van der Horst et al., 2010) . Reinforcement learning is the simplest translation of the idea that actions associated to high rewards are more often repeated, while belief-based learning relies on updating beliefs (probability distributions) over the actions of other players and/or the state of the environment, which occurs in Bayesian learning. In the EWA model, belief-based learning is made possible thanks to the ability to imagine outcomes of unchosen actions (Emery and Clayton, 2004) ; this is captured by the parameter δ i , which is the key to differentiate reinforcement from belief-based learning models.
Belief-based learning is captured in the EWA model since motivations can represent the expected payoff of action over the distribution of beliefs of the actions of other players (Camerer and Ho, 1999) , and the logit choice function further allows an individual to best respond to the actions of others. It then turns out that the Smooth Fictitious Play (FP) rule (Table 1) is equivalent to Bayesian learning for initial priors over the actions of others (stage game t = 1) that follow a Dirichlet distribution (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998, p. 48-49) .
In EWA, the learning dynamics of an individual (Eqs. (1)- (4)) is a complex discrete time stochastic process because action choice is probabilistic and it depends on the (random) actions played by other individuals in the population, and on the random variable in a 2 × 2 Hawk-Dove game with π(1, 1) = B/2, π(1, 2) = 0, π(2, 1) = B, π(2, 2) = B/2−C , where B = 5 and C = 3. The blue line represents the probability p 1,t to play Dove for individual 1 and the red line the probability p 2,t to play Dove for individual 2 when the learning rule is characterized by φ i,t = 1+1/t, ρ i = 1, λ i = 1, n i,1 = 1 for both players (rule called Pure Reinforcement Learning, PRL in Table 1) . Parameters values for player 1 are δ 1 = 0, M 1,1 (Dove) = 1, and M 1,1 (Hawk) = 0 (hence p 1,1 ≈ 0.73), while for player 2 they are δ 2 = 0, M 2,1 (Dove) = 0, and M 2,1 (Hawk) = 1 (hence p 2,1 ≈ 0.27).
ω t . In Fig. 1 , we show a simulation of a typical learning dynamics of two interacting individuals who learn according to the EWA model (Eqs. (1)- (4)) in a repeated Hawk-Dove game, and with actions play probabilities following the logit choice rule (Eq. (6)). Is it possible to approximate this dynamics in order to obtain a qualitative understanding of the change of play probabilities?
Stochastic approximation
Differential equations for motivations
We now use stochastic approximation theory (Ljung, 1977; Benveniste et al., 1991; Benaïm, 1999; Kushner and Yin, 2003) in order to derive a system of differential equations (ODE) for the motivations and choice probabilities, which produces qualitative and quantitative results about learning dynamics.
The idea behind stochastic approximation is to write Eq. (1) under the form of a difference equation with decreasing step-size, which then allows one to compute the expected change of the dynamics over one time step. These expected dynamics give rise to differential equations, which describe very closely the long-run stochastic dynamics of the motivations (see Benaïm, 1999 , for a standard reference, and Hopkins, 2002 , for an application of this principle to learning). To that aim, we write Eq. (1) as
is a decay rate and
can be interpreted as the net reinforcement of the motivation of action a. In order to use stochastic approximation theory, we need that the step-size of the process satisfies (Benaïm, 1999, p. 11) , where the first condition entails that the steps are large enough to eventually overcome initial conditions, while the second condition entails that the steps eventually become small enough so that the process converges. This is ensured here by setting ρ = 1 in Eq. (2). We further assume a constant value of ϵ i from now on (this is the case for all rules in Table 1 , but a slowly varying ϵ i,t is still amenable to an analysis via stochastic approximation). Note however that the assumption that ρ = 1 reduce to some extent the number of learning rules that one can analyze in the EWA model, but the approximation can still be useful for small constant step-sizes, for instance if one considers a Linear Operator Rule (Table 1) with φ i close to 1 (see Benaïm and Hirsch, 1999b; Izquierdo et al., 2007 , for results on processes with constant step-sizes).
With these assumptions, we show in Appendix A (Eqs. (A.1)-(A.12)) that the differential equation arising from taking the expected motion of the stochastic dynamics in Eq. (7) iṡ
and
Here, a dot accent is used to denote a derivative, i.e., dx/dt =ẋ, 
depend on the motivations, Eq. (10) is a differential of the forṁ
, for all actions a and individual i in the population, where M denotes the vector collecting the motivations of all actions and individuals in the population. Hence, Eqs. (10)- (12) define a bona fide autonomous system of differential equations.
Eq. (11) shows that the deterministic approximation rests on the ''average game'' with payoffs given byπ i (a, a −i ), i.e., a game where each payoff matrix entry (Eq. (12)) is a weighted average of the corresponding entries of the stage games over the distribution of environmental states µ(ω). Hence, if one wants to consider a situation where the stage game fluctuates, one does not need to specify a series of stage games, but only the average game resulting from taking the weighted average of the payoffs of the original stage games.
Differential equations for action play probabilities
Using the logit choice rule (Eq. (6)) and the dynamics of motivations (Eq. (10)), we can derive a differential equation for the choice probability for each action a of individual i
(Appendix A, Eqs. (A.13)-(A.20)). BecauseR i (a) depends on the action play probabilities, Eq. (13) also defines a bona fide autonomous system of differential equations, but this time directly for the dynamics of action. The first term in brackets in Eq. (13) describes a perturbation to the choice probability. This represents the exploration of action by individual i (it is an analogue of mutation in evolutionary biology), and brings the dynamics back into the interior of the state space if it gets too close to the boundary. The second term in the brackets takes the same form as the replicator equation (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Tuyls et al., 2003) ; that is, if the expected reinforcement,R i (a), to action a is higher than the average expected reinforcement,
then the probability of expressing action a increases. Eq. (13) is the ''final'' point of the stochastic approximation applied to our model. We now have a system of differential equations [of dimension N × (m − 1)], which describes the ontogeny of behavior of the individuals in the population. Standard results from stochastic approximation theory guarantee that the original stochastic dynamics (Eqs. (1)- (4)) asymptotically follows very closely the deterministic path of the differential equation (13). For instance, if the limit set of Eq. (13) consists of isolated equilibria, the stochastic process (Eqs. (1)-(4)) will converge to one of these equilibria almost surely (Benaïm, 1999; Borkar, 2008) .
More generally, the differential equations for the action probabilities are unlikely to depend only on the probabilities as is the case in Eq. (13). For instance, when the choice rule is the so-called power choice, the dynamics of actions will also depend on the dynamics of motivations (i.e., f (M) = M λ i in Eq. (4), which gives .22) ). This is one of the reasons why the logit choice rule is appealing; namely, it yields simplifications allowing one to track only the dynamics of choice probabilities (Eq. (13)).
Applications
Pure reinforcement vs. payoff-informed learning
We now apply our main result (Eq. (13)) to a situation where two individuals (N = 2) are interacting repeatedly and can express only two actions during the stage game, action 1 and 2. In this case, only three generic symmetric stage games are possible: A game with a dominant strategy (e.g., a Prisoner's Dilemma game, PD), a game with two pure asymmetric Nash Equilibria (e.g., a Hawk-Dove game, HD), and a game with two pure symmetric NE (e.g., a Coordination Game, CG) so that the set of games can be taken to be Ω = {PD, CG, HD} (Weibull, 1997, Chap. 1) . We call R ω the payoff obtained when the game is ω and both players play action 1 (see Table 2 for the description of the payoffs for each game ω), so that the average payoff obtained when both players play action 1 is R = µ(PD)R PD + µ(CG)R CG + µ(HD)R HD . Likewise, one can evaluate the payoffs S, T , and P of the average game, when, respectively, player 1 plays action 1 and player 2 plays action 2, player 1 plays action 2 and player 2 plays action 1, and both players play action 2 (Table 2) . Table 2 Payoff matrices for the average Hawk-Dove game and the three associated sub-games. In each matrix, the rows correspond to the actions of player 1 (first row gives action 1, while second row gives action 2) and the columns correspond to the actions of player 2 (first column gives action 1, while second column gives action 2). Payoffs are to row player (player 1). The matrix at the top shows the payoffs in the average Hawk-Dove Game (denotedḠ), and the three matrices below contain the payoffs of the sub-games ω (PD, HD, and CG). In the Prisoner's Dilemma (Left), we assume T PD > R PD > P PD > S PD and (T PD + S PD )/2 < R PD . In the Hawk-Dove (Middle), we have T HD > R HD , S HD > P HD , P HD > R HD . In the Coordination Game (Right), R CG > S CG , R CG = P CG , S CG = T CG .
We assume that individuals playing this stochastic game use the learning rules characterized by
so that when δ i = 0 we obtain a form of reinforcement learning, which we call Pure Reinforcement Learning (PRL: see Table 1 ) because motivations are updated only according to realized payoffs and there is no discounting of the past. When δ i = 1 we obtain a rule we call Payoff-Informed Learning (IL: see Table 1 ) since in that case an individual updates motivations according not only to realized but also to imagined payoffs. The individual has here all information about possible payoffs at each decision step t, hence the name of the learning rule.
Substituting Eqs. (14) into Eq. (8) gives ϵ i,t = 0 (since n t = t) and thus ϵ i = 0 in Eq. (13). Letting p 1 = p 1 (1) be the probability that individual 1 plays action 1 and p 2 = p 2 (1) be the probability that individual 2 plays action 1, we then obtain from Eq. (8), the above assumptions, and Table 2 , that the action play probabilities satisfy the dynamicṡ
In order to compare the dynamics predicted by Eqs. (15)- (16) to that obtained from iterating Eq. (1) with logit choice function Eq. (6) (agent-based simulations), we assume that the average game is a Hawk-Dove game (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973; Maynard Smith, 1982) . Hence, action 1 can be thought as ''Dove'' and action 2 as ''Hawk''. We now focus on two specific interactions in this Hawk-Dove game: PRL vs. PRL, and PRL vs. IL, and in order to carry out the numerical analysis, we also assume that the probability µ(ω) that game ω obtains in any period obeys an uniform distribution, which gives µ(PD) = µ(CG) = µ(HD) = 1/3.
PRL vs. PRL
When two PRL play against each other (Eqs. (15)- (16) with δ i = 0 for both players) in the average Hawk-Dove game, we find that the deterministic dynamic admits three locally stable equilibria ( Fig. 2A) : the two pure asymmetric Nash equilibria, (Dove, Hawk) and (Hawk, Dove), and the Pareto efficient outcome where both individuals play Dove (Appendix B). Which outcome is reached by the differential equations depends on the initial conditions, and we characterized a region of the state space of initial conditions that always lead to the (Dove, Dove) equilibrium (the gray region in Fig. 2A ).
In Fig. 3 , we compare the deterministic model to the original stochastic learning dynamics by graphing the distance between the probability of playing Dove obtained from the equilibrium of Eqs. (15)- (16) to that obtained from Eq. (6) under agent-based simulations for various values of the duration of the game, T .
The correspondence between the two processes is affected by the sensitivity to payoff, λ, and the initial difference in motivations to a player between playing Dove and Hawk:
likely to play Dove initially since its probability to play Dove is bigger than 0.5, while the player is more likely to play Hawk if the difference is negative (∆M i,1 < 0, which entails a probability to play Dove lower than 0.5).
We observe that when λ is very small, the probability of playing an action in the stochastic dynamics remains far from the equilibrium predicted by the deterministic dynamics even if T is large. But when λ i becomes larger, the match between simulation and approximation becomes very good even for moderate T , unless the difference in initial motivations between actions is close to zero (∆M i,1 = 0). In this case, the initial probability of choosing actions is about 1/2 for both players and one cannot predict which equilibrium is reached in the deterministic dynamics because the stochastic dynamics may go to any of the three locally stable equilibria (Fig. 2C) . These features were generally observed when the initial motivations of the players in the stochastic simulations concord with the predicted equilibrium; namely, if the motivations entail initial play probabilities that are closer to the equilibrium than random choice of actions (e.g., if playing Dove is an equilibrium, then we say that a probability to play Dove that is bigger than 0.5 concords with the equilibrium).
When the initial motivations of an individual do not concord with an equilibrium, it has to revert his initial preferences. This may for instance be the case when the initial play probabilities of both player favor the equilibrium (Hawk, Hawk), so that M i,1 (1) < M i,1 (2), which entails a probability to play Dove lower than 0.5. But (Hawk, Hawk) is an unstable equilibrium for the deterministic dynamics, and we know that reinforcement learners cannot learn a behavior that yields a strictly negative payoff as is the case when the equilibrium (Hawk, Hawk) is played. This means that at least one of the players will have to revert its initial preferences in order to reach one of the three stable outcomes, (Dove, Dove), (Hawk, Dove) or (Dove, Hawk).
If preferences need to be reversed and one further has a large λ value, the initial play probability of Dove is close to 0, which is very close to the lower-left corner of the state space in Fig. 2A . Preference reversal may then take a very long time, and Fig. 4 shows that the time t * of such a reversal to occur is an increasing function of the magnitude of ∆M i,1 . Consequently, while the value of T did not have an important influence on the correspondence between deterministic and stochastic dynamics when the initial preferences were concordant with the predicted equilibrium and λ is not too small (Fig. 3) , T becomes very important when this is not the case. In effect, when preferences need to be reversed under small T and large ∆M i,1 and λ, one can predict that the difference in play probability observed under the deterministic and stochastic dynamics will be important (as in the lightly shaded regions in Fig. 3 ). go to the (1, 1) equilibrium (Dove, Dove). In panels A and B a white-filled dot denotes an unstable node (both associated eigenvalues are positive), a gray-filled dot is a saddle, and a black dot is a locally stable equilibrium. For the stochastic trajectories (C, D), each color designates a given simulation run (with λ i = 0.5 for both players and T = 2000) describing a sample path ending in a different equilibrium predicted by the deterministic dynamics. We started all simulations runs from the center of the state space (i.e., p 1 = p 2 = 1/2 and ∆M 1,1 = ∆M 2,1 = 0), and each point denotes an interactions round, t. We observe that points are far from each other at the beginning of a simulation run but accumulate near a stable equilibrium at the end of a simulation run. This is because the stochastic shocks are large at the beginning (when the step-size is big), but are smaller as the step-size decreases.
PRL vs. IL
When a PRL plays against an IL (Eqs. (15)- (16)) with δ 1 = 0 for PRL and δ 2 = 1 for IL), we find that asymptotically both players will learn one of the two pure asymmetric Nash equilibria, (Hawk, Dove) and (Dove, Hawk), of the average game, depending on the initial preferences of the players (Appendix B, Eq. (B.2)).
As was the case for PRL vs. PRL, the match between deterministic model and stochastic simulation for finite time depends on λ i and ∆M i,1 (Fig. 3B, D, F) . However, in this case the region around ∆M i,1 = 0, where the analysis gives poor predictions of the real behavior seems larger. Otherwise, the same caveat that we observed for PRL vs. PRL also apply to PRL vs. IL. In summary, we observed that the deterministic dynamics (Eqs. (15)- (16)) generally approximates qualitatively well the quasiequilibrium probabilities of playing action obtained under the stochastic learning processes (Eqs. (1)- (4)), but there are extreme cases which are not captured by the deterministic approximations.
These are the cases where λ and ∆M i,1 are very small (actions are random) or λ and ∆M i,1 are too big (the dynamics get stuck in suboptimal equilibria). In particular, when ∆M i,1 is too big, the time t for which the stochastic learning process gets close to the deterministic approximation becomes very large (Fig. 4) . Now that we have a feeling about the conditions under which the stochastic approximation can be applied, we turn to the analysis of an evolutionary model of the competition between two different learning rules.
Coevolution of learning and scrounging
Arbilly et al. (2010) explored using agent-based simulations an evolutionary model of foraging where individuals learn to find patches with high quality food. These producers can then be followed by scroungers with which they compete over resources found in the patches. In the same spirit as Arbilly et al. (2010) , we analyze here a model for the coevolution between learning and scrounging. Our aim, however, is not to reproduce the results of this earlier model. Rather, it is to analyze a simplified model that is amenable to an illustrative application of the stochastic approximation method in a context where there is competition between learning rules.
Biological setting
We consider a population of very large size (say N → ∞), whose members are facing the problem of foraging in an environment consisting of two patch types, labeled 1 and 2. The resource value to an individual foraging in a patch of type a is written V (a) (a = 1, 2) and we assume that V (1) > V (2) ≥ 0.
In such an environment, learning is necessary, for example, if the location of the optimal patch type changes from one generation to the next.
At each decision step t (1 ≤ t < T ) during its lifetime, a learner has to make a choice on whether to forage on patch type 1 or 2 so that the two available actions to a learner are feeding on patch 1 or 2 and its action set can be written {1, 2}. The payoff from feeding on a given patch depends on the number of other individuals on that patch. We assume that there can be no more than two individuals on a patch, so the payoff, π i (a i,t , a −i,t ) to individual i taking action a i,t ∈ {1, 2} at time t is either V (a i,t ) or V (a i,t )/2, where a −i,t is the random indicator variable representing the presence of another individual on the patch of individual i at time t. If individual i is alone on the patch (which we write a −i,t = 0), it gets the whole resource: π i (a i,t , 0) = V (a i,t ). If there is another individual on the patch (which we write a −i,t = 1), individual i shares its value with the scrounger so its payoff is π i (a i,t , 1) = V (a i,t )/2. We assume that there are three types of individuals in this population: Scroungers (S), Fictitious Players (FP), and Exploratory Reinforcement Learners (ERL, see Table 1 ), where both learners (ERL and FP) are exploratory (ϵ = 1 in Eq. (13)). The life-cycle of these individuals is as described above (Section 2.1). Note that PRL and IL in the Hawk-Dove game model were characterized by ϵ = 0 (no explicit exploration). Here, FP and ERL can be thought respectively as an extension of PRL and IL to the case of exploratory learning, because the only difference between the rules of the previous Hawk-Dove model (IL and PRL) and the ones in this foraging model (FP and ERL) is the value of ϵ, which determines the presence of explicit exploration (see Table 1 for a comparison of these rules). Scroungers do not learn but only follow learners (ERL and FP) and we now describe the learning dynamics of these two types. For simplicity, we do not consider innates (e.g., Feldman et al., 1996; Wakano et al., 2004) as these are likely to be replaced by learners if the latter visit patch type 1 with a probability larger than that obtained by encountering patches at random, and learning is not too costly.
Fictitious play
Substituting ϵ = 1 into Eq. (13), and letting p F = p F (1) be the probability that an individual of type FP visits patch 1, we obtain that the learning dynamics of FP obeys the differential equatioṅ
For this model of patch choice, the expected reinforcement to an FP (Eq. (11)) when foraging on patch type a isR
where s denotes the frequency of scroungers in the population.
Settingṗ F = 0 one obtains the probability of visiting patch 1 at steady state of learning aŝ Fig. 5A shows that the agreement between predicted equilibrium and that obtained in agent-based simulations is outstanding even if T is not too large, which stems from the fact that the dynamics has a single equilibrium.
Exploratory reinforcement learning
For exploratory reinforcement learning, substituting ϵ = 1 into Eq. (13), we obtain that the probability that an ERL visits patch 1 obeyṡ
where the expected reinforcements (Eq. (11)) of going on patch types 1 and 2 are, respectively, given bȳ 
The equilibria of Eq. (20) cannot be solved analytically (this is a transcendental equation in p E ). We thus relied on a numerical
analysis to obtain its fixed points (ṗ E = 0) and focused on the variation of λ E values by performing a bifurcation analysis (with Newton's method using Mathematica, Wolfram Research, Inc., 2011). Fig. 6 shows that the phase line passes through three different regimes as λ E increases. These regimes are separated by two critical values of λ E , which we will call λ crit 1 E and λ crit 2 E , and provide the following cases.
(I) When 0 < λ E < λ crit 1 E , the learning dynamics admit one stable interior equilibrium, which is close to 0.5 when λ E is close to 0 and increases as λ E increases, until λ E reaches λ
, there are three interior equilibria. The ''completely interior'' equilibrium is unstable and the two other interior equilibria are stable. As λ E increases, the two stable equilibria get closer to 0 and 1 and finally collapse when
, there is only one interior equilibrium that is unstable. As λ E gets bigger, this equilibrium approaches V (2)/[V (1) + V (2)]. In this case, the learner visits only patch 1 when the initial condition is above this value, and visits only patch 0 when the initial condition is below that value.
We also ran simulations of the original stochastic learning dynamics to test the robustness of this numerical analysis and observed that simulations agree very well on average with our numerical analysis based on the stochastic approximation results (Fig. 5B) .
In the two cases where there are two stable equilibria (cases II and III), which equilibrium is reached depends on the initial conditions of the system (the initial motivations). We postulate that the initial preference for the patch types is drawn at random from a uniform distribution (Appendix D, Eq. (C.3)), which allows us to obtain an expected equilibrium probability that an ERL visits patch 1. When λ E becomes large, this expectation is the average over visiting only patch 1 or 2, which giveŝ
(Appendix D). This gives the matching law (Herrnstein, 1970) , if one rescales V (1) and V (2) between 0 and 1 so that they describe the probability to find food at all in the respective patches rather than measuring the ''value'' of the patches.
Payoff functions
In order to derive the fecundity (or payoff) functions of the three types (ERL, FP, and S), we make the assumption that learners have reached the equilibrium behavior described in the previous section (p F given Eq. (19) for FP andp E given by the expectation over the various equilibria like in Eq. (22). We further denote by q the frequency of FP, so that 1 − q − s gives the frequency of ERL. With probabilityp i (i ∈ {E, F}), a learner goes to patch 1, while with probability 1 −p i , it goes to patch 2. The fecundity (or payoff) of the two learners is then given by
where k is the cost of individual learning and we assumed that all individuals have a baseline reproductive output of α.
Because we assumed that only a single scrounger can follow a producer, the expected frequency of interactions of a scrounger with a producer is proportional to (1 − s)/s, and the fecundity of a scrounger is assumed to be given by
This entails that scroungers have no preference for FP or ERL. They follow an FP with a probability q/(1−s) and follow an ERL with the complementary probability (1 − q − s)/(1 − s). When a scrounger follows a learner of type i on patch a, the scrounger gets half of the value of the patch, V (a)/2. This learner goes to patch 1 with a probabilityp i , or goes to patch 2 with probability 1 −p i , hence the expected payoff to a scrounger conditional on the event that it follows a learner of type
ESS analysis
With the above assumptions, the change in frequencies of the types after one generation is given by (25)) in the producer-scrounger model on the 3-strategy simplex as a function of λ E and λ F . In the light shaded region, ERL is the most performant (p E >p F ), while in the dark shaded region, FP is the most performant (p F >p E ). The simplex drawn in the light region is plotted forp E >p F and hence verifies that the mix between ERL and scroungers is the unique ESS. The simplex in the dark region corresponds to the case where the unique ESS is the mix between FP and scroungers. At the corner labeled FP on the simplices, we have (q = 1, s = 0), at the corner ERL we have (q = 0, s = 0) and at the corner S we have (q = 0, s = 1). A white-filled dot denotes an unstable node, a gray-filled dot is a saddle, and the black dot corresponds to the unique ESS. These simplices were produced using the Baryplot package (McElreath, 2010) 
Because the payoff to scroungers exceeds that of producers when they are in low frequency s → 0 (for V (1) > 0 and/or V (2) > 0), the two equilibria where there is a mix between scroungers and producers are stable in a reduced 2-strategy dynamics (on the faces of the simplex). Hence, the three trivial equilibria are unstable. The question then is which one of the two other equilibria obtains. Because the fecundity of each type of producer does not depend on the other type and in the same way on the frequency of scroungers (Eq. (23)), the mix between scroungers and FP is invaded by ERL if they produce more resources. Namely, if the latter visit more often the optimal patch, which obtains if
This invasion condition is not necessarily satisfied when λ E > λ F , and in Fig. 7 we display the regions of values of λ F and λ E where it is satisfied. These regions seem to alternate in a non-trivial way. Interestingly, the region where ERL outcompetes FP looks fairly large for our parameter values. When λ E becomes very large, it is possible to have an exact invasion condition by substituting Eqs. (19) and (22) into Eq. (27), which implies that ERL invades the stable mix of FP and S if and only if
Summing up the above analysis, there is a globally stable state for the 3-strategy replicator dynamics in this producer-scrounger model that is the mix between scroungers and the most performant producer. In this unique evolutionarily stable state, producers are in frequency
Which of the producer type will be maintained in the population (FP or ERL) critically depends on the exploration rate (λ F and λ E ). It is noteworthy that it is not the learner with the highest value of λ i that will invade. The main reason for this is that increasing λ E for ERL does not always leads to a higher probability of visiting patch 1. When λ E is relatively small, this is actually true (in regime I of the learning dynamics of ERL, Fig. 6 ) but when λ E grows (regimes II and III), ERL suddenly becomes prone to absorption in a state where it visits patch 2 with a probability greater than 0.5 (p E < 0.5). This makes ERL less performant than FP for high values of λ i (the upperright region in Fig. 7 ). Further, when λ i is very small (the lowerleft region in Fig. 7) , ERL seems to be less sensitive than FP to an increase in λ i .
Discussion
In this paper, we used stochastic approximation theory (Ljung, 1977; Benveniste et al., 1991; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Benaïm, 1999; Kushner and Yin, 2003; Sandholm, 2011) in order to analyze the learning of actions over the course of an individual's lifespan in a situation of repeated social interactions with environmentally induced fluctuating game payoffs. This setting may represent different ecological scenarios and population structures, where interactions can be represented as an iterated N-person game or a multi-armed bandit. The learning dynamics was assumed to follow the experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning mechanism (Camerer and Ho, 1999; Ho et al., 2007) . This is a motivational-based learning process, which encompasses as special cases various learning rules used in biology such as the linear operator (McNamara and Houston, 1987; Bernstein et al., 1988; Stephens and Clements, 1998) , relative payoff sum (Harley, 1981; Hamblin and Giraldeau, 2009 ) and Bayesian learning (RodriguezGironés and Vásquez, 1997; Geisler and Diehl, 2002) .
When a behavioral process has a decreasing step-size (or a very small constant step-size), stochastic approximation theory shows that the behavioral dynamics is asymptotically driven by the expected motion of the original stochastic recursions. Stochastic approximation is thus appealing because once the expected motion of the stochastic learning process is derived, one is dealing with deterministic differential equations that are easier to analyze. Further, the differential equations governing action play probabilities under the EWA model that we have obtained (Eq. (13)) have a useful interpretation. They show that learning is driven by a balance between two forces. First, the exploration of actions that tends to bring the dynamics out of pure states, which is analogous to mutation in evolutionary biology. Second, the exploitation of actions leading to higher expected reinforcement, which is analogous to selection in evolutionary biology. This second part actually takes the same qualitative form as the replicator equation (Eq. (13)), since actions leading to an expected reinforcement higher than the average expected reinforcement will have a tendency to be played with increased probability. Although it may be felt in retrospect that this result is intuitive, it is not directly apparent in the original stochastic recursions of the behavioral rule, which encompasses parameters tuning the levels of cognition of individuals (Eq. (1)).
Our model is not the first where analogues of replicator dynamics appear out of an explicit learning scheme (e.g., Börgers and Sarin, 1997; Hopkins, 2002; Tuyls et al., 2003; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 2003) . But, apart from Hopkins (2002), we are not aware of results that link the replicator dynamics to reinforcement learning and belief-based learning at the same time, which was extended here to take fluctuating social environments into account. Although we considered only individual learning without environmental detection in our formalization (i.e., individuals learn the average game), the reinforcement of motivations could take social learning into account (e.g., Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1983; Schlag, 1998; Sandholm, 2011) , and/or individuals may detect changes in the environment so that the motivations themselves may depend on environmental states (e.g., evaluate the dynamics of motivations M t (a, ω) for action-state pairs). The consequences of incorporating these features for action ontogeny may be useful to analyze in future research.
We applied our results to analyze the dynamics of action play probabilities in a situation of repeated pairwise interactions in a 2 × 2 fluctuating game with average Hawk-Dove payoffs, where we investigated interactions between different learning rules, a situation that is very rarely addressed analytically (but see Leslie and Collins, 2005; Fudenberg and Takahashi, 2011) . Comparison with stochastic simulations of the original learning dynamics indicate that the deterministic dynamics generally approximates qualitatively well the quasi-equilibrium of action play probabilities obtained under the original stochastic process. Even if the theory can only prove that the stochastic approximation of processes with decreasing step-sizes ''works'' when time becomes very large (the differential equation are guaranteed to track the solutions of the stochastic process only asymptotically, Benaïm, 1999) , our simulations suggest that stochastic approximation can, under good circumstances, give fair predictions for finite-time behavior (in our case, for T = 100, 500, and 1000), and also for the ontogeny of behavior (Fig. 8) . This may be useful in the context of animal behavior, when lifespan is short.
We also observed one limitation associated with using stochastic approximation in our examples. Namely, there are situations that are not captured by the deterministic approximation. These involve the cases where the sensitivity to payoff (λ) and the difference between initial motivations (∆M i,1 ) are very small so that actions are random, and the cases where λ and ∆M i,1 are very big so that the dynamics get stuck in suboptimal equilibria. In particular, when ∆M i,1 is very large, individuals may have to reverse their initial preferences and this makes very large the time for which the stochastic learning process gets close to its asymptotic approximation.
Finally, we applied our results to analyze the evolutionary competition between learners and scroungers in a producer-scrounger game, where we considered that learners are producers (who search and find good patches of food) and scroungers follow the producers. Three types were present in the population: individuals who learn according to Exploratory Reinforcement Learning, individuals who learn according to Stochastic Fictitious Play (Table 1) , and scroungers. This evolutionary model leads, at the ESS, to the co-existence of scrounger with the most performant of the two learning rules. In particular, we showed that the exploration rate (λ i ) influences which is the most performant producer, but the effect of λ i is non-linear. This shows that different learning rules are very differently affected by varying the exploration rate. The exploration rate and the choice rule (Eq. (4)) thus makes part of the definition of a learning rule, and λ i may interact in a nonintuitive way with the other parameter of the process that affect motivation updating.
While in this paper we analyzed certain learning rules with decreasing step-size, it remains an open empirical question to document how common this type of learning rules are in nature. It seems that previous work in animal psychology and behavioral ecology focused more on rules with constant step-sizes (e.g., the linear operator, Bush and Mostelller, 1951; Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Hamblin and Giraldeau, 2009; Arbilly et al., 2010) because the step-size has here a clear interpretation in terms of a discount factor (or learning rate) and takes into account known phenomena such as habituation or forgetting. But it will be relevant to determine how well rules with decreasing step-size fit animal behavior. In particular, we suspect that such behavioral rules could describe accurately learning processes where early experience is critical to shape general behavior and where further information is used only to fine tune actions (e.g., developmental processes) and where preference reversal becomes unlikely.
In summary, although we illustrated some shortcoming of applying stochastic approximation, we showed that it can be a and λ i = 10. We simulated the process for T = 500 interactions and the time on the x-axis is measured on the timescale of the interpolated stochastic process (the τ n in Benaïm, 1999) , which is used to plot the numerical solution of the differential equations.
useful approach to learn about learning dynamics and to avoid ''the behavioral gambit'' (Fawcett et al., 2013; Lotem, 2013) . But even if action play probabilities can be approximated by differential equations, there are many aspects of the concomitant dynamics that we did not analyze here, and that are likely to be relevant in the context of animal learning. This opens paths to future work, which could for instance analyze rules with constant step-size, produce finite-time predictions for play probabilities, evaluate the effect of learning speed on payoff under different patterns of environmental fluctuations, or investigate state-dependent motivations. Studying these aspects may be relevant to better understand learning dynamics and behavioral ontogeny.
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Appendix A. Stochastic approximation
A.1. Expected motion of motivations
Here, we derive Eq. (10) of the main text from Eq. (7). To that end, we call M i,t = (M i,t (1), . . . , M i,t (m)) the vector collecting the motivations of individual i at time t and M t = (M 1,t , . . . , M N,t ) the vector of motivations in the whole population at time t. We also denote by M −i,t the motivations of all individuals except individual i at time t. With this, the expectation of R i (a, a i,t , a −i,t , ω t ) Eq. (9) given current motivational state can be written as
where p i,t (h | M i,t ) is the probability that individual i takes action h given its current motivations
the joint probability that the opponents of individual i play action profile a −i when they have motivational state M −i,t , and µ(ω) denotes the probability of state ω under the stationary distribution of environmental states (we will reason in terms of the long run behavior of the learning dynamics in the following).
For simplicity of presentation, we will use the notation of Eq. 
where a j denotes the j-th element of the vector a −i .
With the above definitions, we can write Eq. (7) as
where the term (Benaïm, 1999; Benaïm and El Karoui, 2005, p. 173 ) allow us to approximate the original stochastic process (Eq. (A.3) ) with the deterministic differential equatioṅ
The solutions of the original stochastic recursion (Eq. (1)) asymptotically track solutions of this differential equation. In particular, it has been established that the stochastic process almost surely converges to the internally chain recurrent set of the differential equation (A.4) (Benaïm, 1999, Prop. 4 .1 and Th. 5.7). The simplest form of a chain recurrent set is the set of equilibrium points of the dynamics (the particular applications of our model that we study do not go beyond these cases). Note that in continuous time the equations are deterministic and we remove the subscript t to M t for ease of presentation.
A.2. Differential equation in terms of mean payoff
Here, we show that it is possible to simplify the expression of the expected reinforcementR i,t (a, M t ) for our explicit learning model (Eq. (1)). First, recall from Eq. (9) that for action a of player i, the realized reinforcement has the form
We see that
In order to find an expression for the expected reinforcement R i,t (a, M t ), it is useful to rewrite Eq. (A.5) as 
Factoring out, we havē
 .
(A.9) Define the average payoff
(A.10)
Taking expectation, then produces (13)) by combining the ODE for the motivations (Eq. (10)) with the choice rule (Eq. (4)), under the assumption that the choice rule is the logit choice function (Eq. (6)).
Differentiating the left and right member of Eq. (4) with respect to time t, we have by the chain rulė
and substituting Eq. (4) giveṡ
.
(A.14)
Using f (M) = exp (λ i M) in the choice function (Eq. (4)) gives Eq. (6), which implies (A.15) whereby Eq. (A.14) can be written aṡ 
(A.17)
But from the choice probabilities (Eq. (6)) we have the identity
and on substitution into Eq. (A.17) produceṡ
(A.20)
A.3.2. Power choice
Here, we perform the same derivation as in the last section
in Eq. (A.14) yieldṡ
Since −ϵ i cancels from this equation and for non-negative motivations we have the equality
we can writė
Appendix B. Learning to play Hawk and Dove
Here, we analyze qualitatively the vector fields of Eqs. (15)-(16) with an average Hawk-Dove game. We used Mathematica (Wolfram Research, Inc., 2011) to compute equilibria, eigenvalues and complicated algebraic expressions. We first study the interaction between two PRL and then the interaction between PRL and IL.
B.1. PRL vs. PRL
Pure Reinforcement Learning corresponds to δ i = 0. Thus, replacing δ 1 = δ 2 = 0 in Eqs. (15)- (16) and using the payoffs of the Hawk-Dove game (Table 2) produceṡ
This dynamical system has eight different equilibria. In addition to the four at the corners of the state space [(0,0),(1,1),(0,1),(1,0)], we have two interior equilibria and two symmetric (w.r.t. the line p 1 = p 2 ) equilibria on the edges p 1 = 0 and p 2 = 0 (Table 3) .
Performing a linear stability analysis (Hirsch et al., 2004) near each equilibrium, we find that the vector field can be divided in three regions, each one being the basin of attraction of a locally stable equilibrium. The first one is the region where all trajectories tend to the equilibrium (0, 0). This equilibrium has negative eigenvalues.
Its basin of attraction is delimited by the stable manifolds of the equilibria situated on the edges, precisely situated at . These are ) and where the vector field points south-west. Excluding this specific region, all points below the diagonal line p 1 = p 2 are in the basin of (0, 1) and all points above this line pertain to the basin of (1, 0). The points on this line p 1 = p 2 (again excluding the points that are in the basin of (0, 0)) are on the stable manifold of the interior equilibrium (
).
B.2. PRL vs. IL
Payoff-Informed Learning (IL) corresponds to δ i = 1. Thus, replacing δ 1 = 0 and δ 2 = 1 in Eqs. (15)- (16) and using the payoffs of the Hawk-Dove game (Table 2) , one obtains the dynamical system describing learning between PRL (player 1) and IL (player 2) aṡ ) where the first one is always negative and the second one always positive. This equilibrium thus admits a stable manifold that splits the vector field in two regions: above the stable manifold, this is the basin of attraction of (1, 0) and below it trajectories go to (0, 1) (Fig. 2B ).
Appendix C. Exploratory reinforcement learning
Here we analyze the equilibria of Eq. (20) > 0 (C.1)
for V (1) > V (2) ≥ 0. Thus, an ERL will learn to go on patch type 1 if its initial probability to go on it is greater than V (2)/(V (1)+V (2)), and it will learn to go on patch 2 otherwise. If one draws the initial condition at random from a uniform distribution on [0, 1], the expected equilibrium probability to go on patch type 1 for an ERL iŝ
(C.2)
More generally, Eq. (20) is characterized by several stable equilibria and in order to define the expected equilibrium behavior of ERL we follow the same argument by having a distribution over the initial conditions. We call E the set of stable equilibria, p e E the value of stable equilibrium e, and β e the size of the basin of attraction of equilibrium e. Then, we define the expected probability to go on patch 1 of ERL aŝ
where, by a slight abuse of notation, we still usep E to denote the average. For instance, when we are in equilibrium regime I (Fig. 6 ), i.e., when there is one stable equilibrium, there is only one term in the sum of Eq. (C.3). When we are in equilibrium regime II and III, there are two terms in the sum.
Appendix D. Tit-for-Tat from EWA
Here, we derive the Tit-for-Tat strategy (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Axelrod, 1980; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981) from EWA. This is not a learning rule, but it is interesting that it can be derived from the EWA framework by appealing to the concept of aspiration levels, which are often used in learning models (Gale et al., 1995; Wakano and Yamamura, 2001; Macy and Flache, 2002; Cho and Matsui, 2005; Izquierdo et al., 2007; Chasparis et al., 2010) . This provides a payoff-based (i.e., quantitative) version of TFT, which is easier to justify in terms of neuronal decision-making than the traditional version based on actions of opponent (which is more qualitative). To that aim, we need that the parameters are φ i = 0, ρ i = 0, δ i = 1, n i,1 = 1, and λ i = ∞ (Table 1) , and we subtract aspiration levels to the original motivations, that is, 
where L i (C) is the aspiration level of individual i for cooperation, L i (D) its aspiration level for defection, and where we removed the dependence of the payoffs on the environmental state ω t , because we consider a fixed game. Substituting the payoff from the payoff matrix, Eq. (D.1) produces TFT behavior if
which can be expressed as the single condition
(D.5)
We remark that this payoff-based version of TFT needs that individual i has a bigger aspiration level for defection, i.e., individual i expects more of defection than of cooperation (because T − R > 0).
Also, clearly not all Prisoner's Dilemma games satisfy condition D.5. More precisely, this condition entails that defection needs to risk dominate cooperation (T − P < R − S) for our version of TFT to be implementable.
